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Abstract
Tax-beneﬁt policies affect changes in household incomes through two main channels:
discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilizers. We study their role in the EU
countries in 2007–14 using an extended decomposition approach. Our results show that
the two policy actions often reduced rather than increased inequality of net incomes, and
so helped offset the inequality-increasing impact of growing disparities in gross market
incomes. While inequality reductions were achieved mainly through beneﬁts using both
routes, policy changes to and the automatic stabilization response of taxes and contributions
raised inequality in some countries and lowered it in others.
1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–08 and the subsequent Great Recession posed serious eco-
nomic challenges to Europe. Substantial increases to unemployment, losses to wages and
self-employment income, increase in governments debt and fall in GDP put strain on
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ﬁscal budgets and households ﬁnances.1 In response to such economic challenges, tax-
beneﬁt policies have important implications for household net incomes. They affect in-
comes through two main channels: discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilizers.
Automatic stabilizers characterize the policies’ in-built ﬂexibility to absorb shocks to
earnings and people’s characteristics (Pechman, 1973). They reduce, ceteris paribus, the
need for discretionary policy actions which take time to design and implement and can be
particularly important if the scope for discretionary ﬁscal policies is limited, for example, in
the eurozone (Mabbett and Schelkle, 2007). They are viewed as a crucial tool for reducing
macroeconomic volatility (e.g. Blanchard, Dellariccia and Mauro, 2010). In particular,
income taxes and unemployment insurance beneﬁts in the US, Canada and Europe have
received a great deal of attention in the micro- and macroeconomic literature as important
stabilizers of ﬂuctuations in aggregate output aswell as in disposable income and household
consumption (e.g. Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Browning and Crossley, 2001; Kniesner
and Ziliak, 2002;Auerbach, 2009; Dolls, Fuest and Peichl, 2012; Ferna´ndez Salgado et al.,
2014; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016; McKay and Reis, 2016; Hsu, Matsa and Melzer,
2018).
There is less consensus on the size and direction of impact of discretionary ﬁscal policies
on economic stability (e.g.Taylor, 2000; Feldstein, 2002;Blanchard andPerotti, 2002; Fata´s
and Mihov, 2003; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Caggiano et al., 2015; Miyamoto,
Nguyen and Sergeyev, 2018). But a large body ofmicroeconomic literature has shown their
importance for the income distribution, for example, Clark and Leicester (2005); Sefton
and Sutherland (2005); Sutherland et al. (2008); Bargain (2012) for the UK; Decoster
et al. (2015) for Belgium;Matsaganis and Leventi (2014); DeAgostini, Paulus andTasseva
(2016); Bargain et al. (2017); Hills et al. (2019); Paulus, Sutherland andTasseva (2019) for
selected EU countries. A decomposition approach combined with a tax-beneﬁt calculator
and household micro-data has enabled researchers to identify the direct (non-behavioural)
impact of policy changes on the income distribution. The estimate for the policy effect
has often been compared with the contribution of ‘other’ factors, which encompass the
combined (net) effect of changes to market incomes and population characteristics, and
automatic stabilizers (e.g. Bargain and Callan, 2010; Bargain et al., 2015, 2017). For the
early crisis years (2007–11), the literature agrees that policy changes were broadly poverty-
and inequality-reducing in nearly all EU countries but their redistributive effect became
more heterogeneous across countries between 2011 and 2014.
In contrast, there is little empirical evidence on the redistributive power of automatic
stabilizers. For several Southern EU countries and Ireland, Callan, Doorley and Savage
(2018) ﬁnd that automatic stabilizers –mainly through beneﬁts – reduced income inequality
between 2007 and 2013. For hypothetical earnings shocks, on the other hand, beneﬁts and
taxes are shown to stabilize mostly the incomes of households at the bottom and top of
the distribution, respectively (European Commission, 2017); while Dolls, Fuest and Peichl
1
Between 2007 and 2014, GDP fell in 10 EU countries although it increased in the EU-28 on average (+1.5%).
Government debt as a % of GDP increased in every EU member state and overall by a staggering 51%. The effect
on households was equally severe: the share of unemployed (as a % of the population) increased in all EU countries,
except Germany, and overall by 44%. Real wages and salaries, the main source of household income, fell by 4.4%,
while income from self-employment dropped by nearly 10% on average. See Eurostat database.
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(2011) ﬁnd that households located at the bottom of the distribution are least protected by
policies against shocks.
We aim to contribute to improved understanding of the link between automatic stabi-
lizers and the income distribution by providing an in-depth account of the relative impact
of automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy changes on household incomes in the
EU in recent years (2007–14), covering the latest economic crisis and postcrisis economic
developments. We seek to decompose observed changes in the income distribution into
changes due to: (i) discretionary tax-beneﬁt policy changes, (ii) the automatic stabilization
response of tax-beneﬁt policies, and (iii) gross market incomes and population changes.
Tax-beneﬁt policy changes encompass changes to the design of the tax-beneﬁt system, the
statutory uprating of and discretionary (ad hoc) changes to monetary parameters, such as
beneﬁt amounts and tax thresholds. Automatic stabilizers capture the automatic changes
to beneﬁt entitlements and tax liabilities in response to changes in the distribution of gross
market incomes and population characteristics.
In more detail, we construct counterfactual income distributions, which represent what
would have happened to household incomes in the absence of changes to a certain factor –
either to tax-beneﬁt policies or to market incomes and population characteristics. Compar-
ing the observed and counterfactual distributions allows us to quantify the contribution of
each factor to the change in incomes. Our decomposition approach builds on and extends
the method by Bargain and Callan (2010). We use the EU tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD
to calculate actual and counterfactual entitlements to cash beneﬁts and direct income taxes
and social insurance contributions (SIC) for each household in the micro-data. The micro-
data contain information on population characteristics and market incomes and come from
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and, for the
UK, from the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
Between 2007 and 2014, market incomes became more unequally distributed in more
than a third of the EU countries. In the rest of countries, there was no statistically signiﬁcant
change in inequality asmeasured by theGini coefﬁcient.Our results show that discretionary
policy changes in 21 countries lowered inequality, consistentwith the existing evidence.Our
decomposition by tax-beneﬁt policy adds to the evidence by showing that the reductionwas
achieved mainly through increased generosity of beneﬁt entitlements, rather than through
taxes/SIC. In some countries, the impact of beneﬁt changes was enhanced by inequality-
reducing tax changes, while in others, beneﬁt changes offset a rise in inequality due to tax
changes (e.g. due to the introduction of a ﬂat tax in Bulgaria and Hungary or the reduction
in top marginal tax rates in Denmark).Among the countries implementing progressive pol-
icy changes overall were not only those where the welfare state expanded in size but also
countries, which implemented ﬁscal consolidation measures in the economic downturn.
Automatic stabilizers also contributed in nearly half of the countries to lower inequality.
Although discretionary policies were more often inequality-reducing, the magnitude of the
two types of effect was broadly similar when it comes to narrowing the gap between the rich
and the poor. A further decomposition of the automatic stabilization effect shows that the
effect of beneﬁt stabilization was to reduce inequality in most countries, whereas taxes/SIC
had a mixed effect. The impact on net income of the stabilization response of taxes/SIC
wasnegatively associatedwith changes tomarket incomes/population characteristics across
countries. However, there was effectively no country-level correlation between the latter
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and the stabilization response of beneﬁts. Compared to taxes/SIC, beneﬁts are overall more
responsive to changes in the population structure (such as household composition changes)
than changes in market income.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II explains the decomposition
methodologywith our reﬁnements and extensions to it. Section III describes the data and the
tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD. Section IV presents and discusses the results and Section
V concludes.
2. Methodology
Decomposing discretionary policy changes vs other effects
The central question of the paper is which factors contributed to household income changes
in the EU countries between 2007 and 2014. In particular, we aim to disentangle the
contribution of discretionary tax-beneﬁt policy changes, automatic stabilizers and changes
to market incomes and population characteristics. We separate the effect of each factor by
means of counterfactual simulations, where one factor is allowed to vary at a time while the
rest are kept ﬁxed.We use the decomposition approach by Bargain and Callan (2010) – BC
hereafter – which combines household micro-data with a tax-beneﬁt calculator and allows
us to identify the direct effect of policy changes (i) from all ‘other effects’.2 We reﬁne their
methodology by identifying a broader range of combinations and explicitly distinguishing
between scale-variant and scale-invariantmeasures of the incomedistribution. In the second
step, we extend the BC approach by splitting the ‘other effects’ into automatic stabilizers
(ii) and changes to the distribution of market incomes and population characteristics (iii).
Following BC, we denote with I (·) a functional of the distribution of household in-
come, such as the Gini coefﬁcient or mean income. Household net incomes in period t
are expressed in the form of dt(pt , yt) of which: d is the structure of tax-beneﬁt policies
(e.g. means-tested vs universal child beneﬁt), p are the tax-beneﬁt parameters (e.g. C1,000
family income-test threshold), y is a matrix containing information on gross market in-
comes (e.g. earnings and investment income) and household/individual characteristics, and
d transforms p and y into household net income. In the ﬁrst step, the change in the com-
posite indicator I between two periods (t =0, 1) can be decomposed into the contribution
of discretionary policy changes, other effect and nominal effect, yielding the following
identity:
I = I [d1(p1, y1)]− I [d0(p0, y1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary policy changes
+ I [d0(p0, y1)]− I [d0(p0,y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
other effect
+ I [d0(p0,y0)]− I [d0(p0, y0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal effect
(1)
2
There is a well-established strand in the economic literature which focuses on decomposing the distribution of
individual earnings, for example, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993); DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996); Lemieux
(2002); Fields (2003); Yun (2006), see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) for an overview. However, this strand
overlooks the role of taxation and ignores other income components. The classical source decomposition of income
inequality by Shorrocks (1982) and other related work (e.g. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 2008; Fiorio, 2011;
Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2015) take a step further by decomposing changes to household income but they do not
allow separating out the impact on inequality of policy changes from changes to market incomes.
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The terms I [d1(p1, y1)] and I [d0(p0, y0)] capture the valueof I in the end- and start-period,
respectively; while the terms I [d0(p0, y1)] and I [d0(p0,y0)] are based on intermediate
counterfactual distributions. To make nominal amounts from the two periods comparable,
policy parameters and/or market incomes in the counterfactuals are adjusted by a factor
, which accounts for developments in nominal levels (e.g. prices, wages) or some other
relevant counterfactual benchmark. Price indices appear most appropriate when the aim is
to study how people’s real living standards have changed, while changes in market incomes
are more relevant to understanding shifts in the ﬁscal balance. In our analysis, we base 
on growth in prices (Consumer Price Index, CPI).
The direct effect of discretionary policy changes is estimated by simulating each set of
policy rules, while keeping gross market incomes and populations characteristics constant
(at t = 1 values in Equation (1)). Discretionary policy changes capture both changes to
the structure of the tax-beneﬁt system as well as the effect of statutory uprating of and
discretionary changes to monetary parameters, relative to  (price growth). Thus, if tax-
beneﬁt parameters were changed in line with CPI in practice, our analysis would consider
the outcome neutral against our chosen counterfactual benchmark and themeasured impact
would be zero. If actual tax-beneﬁt parameters were increased slower (faster) than prices,
tax liabilities would go up (down) due to bracket creep and beneﬁt entitlements would fall
(rise) due to beneﬁt erosion. See Paulus et al. (2019) for more discussion on the choice of
 and its implications for the measured policy effect.
In turn, by keeping tax-beneﬁt policies ﬁxed (at t=0 values in Equation (1)), the other
effect captures changes in (real) market incomes and the characteristics of the population
(e.g. employment), including any behavioural response to the tax-beneﬁt changes.We will
return to this component in the next subsection and decompose it further to analyse the
effect of automatic stabilizers.
Finally, the nominal effect in Equation (1) is a pure scaling effect. For scale-invariant
measures, e.g. the Gini coefﬁcient, the nominal effect is zero as long as the tax-beneﬁt
system is linearly homogeneous3, i.e. changing the nominal units ofmarket incomes and the
tax-beneﬁt parameters simultaneously would not affect the relative position of households
in the income distribution.4 For scale-variant measures, e.g. mean income, the nominal
effect is non-zero as long as  =1.5
The decomposition in equation (1) is path-dependent, meaning that the order of de-
composing the effects matters and there are alternative combinations. Building on BC,
we derive six strictly symmetrical combinations (permutations) for the three components,
whereas they suggested four combinations because of their pairing of the other effect with
the nominal effect.6 Similar to BC, we distinguish between two types of combination:Type
3
That is, homogeneous of degree one: d0(p0, y0) = d0(p0, y0).
4
BC argue that tax-beneﬁt systems are approximately linearly homogeneous, showing it explicitly for France and
Ireland, and therefore omit the nominal effect as they focus on distributional measures rather than income changes
explicitly.
5
The nominal effect is approximately (−1)I [d0(p0, y0)] or (−1) ·100% in relative terms. Notice also that the
other effect for decomposing changes in mean disposable income is approximately zero if = y¯1/ y¯0, i.e.  is based
on changes in average market income.
6
In principle, one could also consider ﬁrst deﬂating I1 (or inﬂating I0) and then decomposing the real value of I ,
as done e.g. in Herault and Azpitarte (2016), but this implies invoking the assumption of linear homogeneity from
the very beginning. For example, denote an inﬂation factor with i and consider d1(p1, y1)− id0(p0, y0)=d1(p1, y1)−
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I shows the effect of discretionary policy changes conditional on end-period market in-
comes and population characteristics (PI ) and the other effect conditional on start-period
tax-beneﬁt policies (OI ). Type II presents the effect of discretionary policy changes condi-
tional on start-period market incomes/population (PII ) and the other effect conditional on
end-period policies (OII ). Distinguishing between Type I and Type II has a clear practical
relevance. While full decomposition can only be carried out once household micro-data
become available for the whole period (which inevitably occurs with a time lag), Type II
assessments for policy effects only require start-period household data and can be carried
out before the policy changes have occurred, hence providing the basis for ex ante policy
evaluation.
As there is no obvious reason to prefer a particular combination over the others, BC
suggest following the Shorrocks–Shapley line of arguments. This essentially implies av-
eraging the marginal contribution of decomposition terms across all combinations. We
hence calculate the average effect due to discretionary policy changes, other and nominal
effects using all six combinations, distinguishing between scale-variant and scale-invariant
measures, deﬁned as I [dt(pt , yt)]= I [dt(pt , yt)] and I [dt(pt , yt)]= I [dt(pt , yt)], respec-
tively. In the following, the observed (baseline) income distributions in t=0, 1 are denoted
with Bt = I [dt(pt , yt)] and the counterfactuals asCt = I [d1−t(p1−t ,1−2tyt)].Assuming linear
homogeneity of the tax-beneﬁt function d(p, y), the average contribution fromdiscretionary
policy changes (P), other effect (O) and nominal effect (N ), combining Type I and Type II
decompositions for scale-variant measures are as follows:
P= 1
2
[PI +PII ]= 16
[(
1

+2
)
(B1 −C1)+ (2+)
(
1

C0 −B0
)]
(2)
O= 1
2
[OI +OII ]= 16
[
(2+)(C1 −B0)+
(
1

+2
)
(B1 −C0)
]
(3)
N = 1
2
[NI +NII ]= −16
[
2

B1 +2B0 +C1 + 1

C0
]
(4)
For scale-invariant measures, these expressions simplify further and the average effect
due to discretionary policy changes (P) and the average other effect (O) are (with the
average nominal effect being N =0):
P= 1
2
[B1 −C1 +C0 −B0] (5)
O= 1
2
[C1 −B0 +B1 −C0] (6)
For details on the derivation of the effects, see Appendix A.
We also split the impact on the income distribution of discretionary policy changes
by beneﬁts and taxes/SIC, estimating their joint distribution. Changes in mean income
d0(ip0, iy0)= [d1(p1, y1)−d0(ip0, y1)]+ [d0(ip0, y1)−d0(ip0, iy0)], which is identical to equation (1) but without the
nominal effect (if i=). However, linear homogeneity is assumed already in the second step here, while it was not
evoked (yet) in equation (1).
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can be expressed simply as a sum of (simultaneous) changes to beneﬁt entitlements and
tax/SIC liabilities, keeping gross market incomes ﬁxed. For changes in income inequality
(Gini coefﬁcient), we quantify changes in the redistributive impact of beneﬁts and taxes,
keeping gross market incomes ﬁxed. The redistributive impact of beneﬁts is measured by
calculating the difference between the Gini coefﬁcients based on gross market income
versus pretax income (gross market income and beneﬁts). The redistributive impact of
taxes/SIC is measured by calculating the difference between the Gini coefﬁcients based on
pretax income versus net income (pretax income less taxes/SIC).
Decomposing the other effects: market income/population effect vs automatic stabilizers
In addition to the direct effect of policy changes, tax-beneﬁt policies can affect the in-
come distribution through automatic stabilizers. They capture the extent to which changes
(shocks) in the distribution of gross market income and population characteristics
(e.g. changes to earnings, varying rate of returns to human and ﬁnancial capital, etc) trans-
late into changes in the distribution of disposable income through automatic adjustments
to beneﬁt entitlements and tax/SIC liabilities. We extend the BC decomposition method
by decomposing the other effect, separating out the changes in market incomes/population
characteristics and the automatic stabilization effect of policies.
To show the contribution of automatic stabilizers to the changes in the income distribu-
tion, ﬁrst we need to distinguish between gross and net incomes. Similar to Figari, Paulus
and Sutherland (2015), we deﬁne dt(pt , yt)= yt + f (dt ,pt , yt) where f denotes net transfers
(i.e. beneﬁts less taxes). Using the term for the other effect from equation (1), we can
rewrite it as
I [y1 + f (d0,p0, y1)]− I [y0 + f (d0,p0,y0)]
= I [y1]+ I [f (d0,p0, y1)]− I [y0]+ I [f (d0,p0,y0)]+  (7)
where  is a residual term.The automatic stabilization effect (A) can be derived as the differ-
ence between the other effect and the contribution of market income/population changes,
captured here asM = I [y1]− [y0]. For exact decomposition (i.e. =0), themeasure I needs
to be additively decomposable by income source (y and f ). While this is a straightforward
application to some indicators (e.g. mean income), it is not for all functionals of the income
distribution such as the Gini coefﬁcient.7 Hence, our decomposition of changes to mean
income unveils the pure contribution of market income/population changes and automatic
stabilizers. When we decompose changes in income inequality our decomposition shows
the joint effect of the automatic stabilizers and the residual term.8
Wedenote asB*t = I [yt] the observed (baseline) distribution of grossmarket incomes and
population characteristics in t=0, 1 and as C*t = I [1−2tyt] the counterfactual distribution.
For scale-variant measures, the market income and population effect (M ), averaged across
all Type I and II combinations, equals:
7
Some methods for decomposing inequality measures link the contribution of a given income source to overall
income inequality with the inequality of the income source itself, its share in total income and/or correlation with
total income (Shorrocks, 1982; Lerman andYitzhaki, 1985; Silber, 1993).
8
Callan et al. (2018) similarly separate the impact of automatic stabilizers on the Gini coefﬁcient and have a
residual term as well.
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M = 1
2
[MI +MII ]= 16
[
(2+)(C*1 −B*0)+
(
1

+2
)
(B*1 −C*0 )
]
(8)
and the average effect of automatic stabilizers:
A= 1
2
[AI +AII ]= 16
[
(2+)(C1 −B0 − (C*1 −B*0))+
(
1

+2
)
(B1 −C0 − (B*1 −C*0 ))
]
(9)
For scale-invariant measures, the average market income/population effect is
M = 1
2
[
C*1 −B*0 +B*1 −C*0
]
(10)
and the average effect due to automatic stabilizers is
A= 1
2
[
C1 −B0 − (C*1 −B*0)+B1 −C0 − (B*1 −C*0 )
]
(11)
For details on the derivation of the effects, see Appendix A.
Furthermore, we break down the change in mean incomes and inequality due to au-
tomatic stabilizers by beneﬁts and taxes/SIC. For changes in mean income, we estimate
the automatic change to beneﬁt entitlements and tax/SIC liabilities. As with discretionary
policy changes, we make use of different income concepts to quantify their contribution
to income inequality: gross market income, pretax income and net income.
Finally, standard errors are provided for the change in mean incomes based on Taylor
approximations and for the change in income inequality measured by the Gini coefﬁcient
by bootstrapping the micro-data samples 1,000 times.
3. Data and the tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD
The household survey data come from the EuropeanUnion Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) and, for the UK, from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). Both
surveys are purpose-built income surveys. For most countries, we use SILCwaves for 2008
and 2015 (with income reference periods 2007 and 2014) and for the UK FRS waves for
2008/09 and 2014/15 incomes, i.e. the most recent waves available at the time of writing.
Due to data availability, income reference years are 2011 and 2014 for Croatia; 2007 and
2013 for Germany; 2008 and 2014 for Malta; and 2006 and 2014 for France. The data
are cross-sectional and contain rich information on household and individual incomes and
characteristics for a nationally representative sample of households. The data collection
and production of EU-SILC in the EU member states have been made as consistent as
possible to enable cross-country comparative analyses.
For baseline (counterfactual) simulations, we apply tax-beneﬁt policies – structure and
parameters – fromone period to the household data on grossmarket incomes and population
characteristics from the same (another) period. This is done by combining the household
data with the EU-wide tax-beneﬁt model EUROMOD, which contains information on the
tax-beneﬁt rules in a speciﬁc period for a given country. The model reads the household
survey data and based on the information in the data, it identiﬁes who should pay an income
tax/SIC or receive a beneﬁt (e.g. the family or individual), and how much needs to be paid
© 2020 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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in taxes/contributions and received in beneﬁt entitlements. The model then combines the
information on gross market incomes from the household data with the calculated tax
liabilities and cash beneﬁt entitlements to derive household net incomes. Similar to the
household data, EUROMOD simulations have been made as consistent as possible across
all countries for the purpose of cross-country comparative research.
EUROMOD simulation results for each policy year included in the model are vali-
dated extensively against administrative data on beneﬁt recipients/tax payers and beneﬁt
spending/tax revenues. Tax-beneﬁt simulation routines (e.g. assumptions or limitations),
data imputations and validation of the results are documented in detail in Country Reports
made available online.9 In addition, comparative summary reports containing validation
and discussion of EUROMOD baseline distributional statistics are published on an annual
basis.10 EUROMODhas been used extensively to address various economic and social pol-
icy research questions, see Sutherland and Figari (2013); Figari et al. (2015) for literature
reviews. In particular, the need for a comparativemicro-simulationmodel for decomposing
changes in the income distribution has made EUROMOD an invaluable tool in the related
literature.
We deal with cash household net incomes which comprise the sum of gross market
incomes (earnings, self-employment income, investment income, income from rent and
private transfers), pensions, means-tested and non-means-tested beneﬁts net of personal
income taxes and employee and self-employed SIC. Means-tested, universal and some
contributory insurance-based beneﬁts as well as direct income taxes and contributions
are calculated by EUROMOD while information on the rest of incomes is taken from the
household data.Although public pensions are not simulated (due to insufﬁcient information
on contributory history in the data), the policy change is approximated through the ofﬁcial
indexation factor used by governments to adjust nominally pension amounts over time.
In absence of large compositional changes in the population (the period we consider is
relatively short), the indexation factor serves as a good proxy for the policy change. In
our analysis of distributional changes, the remaining changes in pension amounts such as
those due to changing pension age – not captured through indexation – is included in the
component of ‘market income/population effect’.
In cases where there is evidence for beneﬁt non-take-up or tax non-compliance, the
simulation results are adjusted to account for it. Adjustments are done for beneﬁt non-
take-up in Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal,
Romania and the UK; and for tax non-compliance in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Romania
(see Appendix B).
The analysis is based on household equivalized incomes. Incomes are equivalized based
on the assumptions that individuals share resources equally with other household members
and economies of scale occur within the household. Incomes are adjusted by the modiﬁed
OECD equivalence scale, assigning a value of 1 to the head, 0.5 for each other individual
aged >=14 and 0.3 for each individual aged <14.
9
https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports
10
For the latest issues, see Tammik (2018); EUROMOD (2018). The latter report relies on a EUROMOD tool,
which was developed as part of this paper.
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4. Results
Changes in mean incomes
The changes to net incomes between 2007 and 2014 are decomposed into the changes
due to discretionary policies, automatic stabilizers, changes to gross market incomes and
population characteristics as well as the nominal effect. Using the CPI-based benchmark
indexation factor, the latter component reﬂects how prices developed and allows other com-
ponents to be interpreted in real terms. In the ﬁrst step, we consider the combined effect
of automatic stabilizers and changes to gross market incomes and population characteris-
tics, labelled as ‘other effect’ in Bargain and Callan (2010). We then extend the standard
decomposition approach by distinguishing between the two subcomponents.
While average net incomes increased in nominal terms in the majority of countries, real
incomes fell in half of countries and rose in the other half, with the change ranging from
−37.8% (Greece) to +33.2% (Bulgaria) – seeTable 1.The nominal effect is not shown here
as it corresponds closely to the CPI reported in Table C.1 (Appendix C).11 Figure 1 further
ranks countries by the real change in mean household net incomes (black circle). Some
of these changes are very substantial and it is remarkable that the extremes occurred in
neighbouring countries. Among the countries experiencing a drop in real income were the
ones hit badly by the crisis in the late 2000s such as Southern European countries, Ireland
and Latvia, while the countries with the highest real income growth include some Eastern
European countries as well as Malta, France and Sweden.
Decomposing the total change, our decomposition clearly reveals that changes in av-
erage incomes in this period have been driven by market incomes and population changes
(white and dark blue bars combined in Figure 1). Furthermore, countries are roughly split
by whether changes in market incomes and population characteristics and discretionary
policy effects (light blue bars) made a positive or negative contribution to household in-
comes on average. The two effects went in the same direction in almost all countries, in
other words, discretionary policies largely reinforced market and population dynamics.
The positive relationship between the two components at the country level suggests that
in the cases where economic conditions were favourable – i.e. incomes were growing
due to ‘other effects’ – governments’ tax-beneﬁt policies boosted household disposable
incomes as well. In contrast, countries experiencing economic contraction implemented
ﬁscal consolidation measures, which squeezed further household budgets. Of course, such
a positive correlation is expected at least in the long-term as governments ought to balance
their budgets over the business cycle. We return to this point below.
Our results for discretionary policy changes are consistent with those by De Agostini
et al. (2016). Focusing on policy changes only, they show further that Southern European
countries implemented ﬁscal consolidation measures in both the crisis period (2008–11) as
well as in the aftermath (2011–14), reinforcing the drop inmean incomes.On theother hand,
they show that the large rise in incomes due to discretionary policy changes in Bulgaria,
Sweden, Poland and Denmark was due to ﬁscal stimulus measures being implemented in
both periods.
11
The sum of all components together with the nominal effect corresponds to the total nominal change in incomes.
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TABLE 1
Decomposition of the percentage change in mean household net income
Total change Market income/ Discretionary Automatic
population effect policy changes stabilizers
AT −0.705 1.206 −2.130*** 0.219
(0.808) (1.517) (0.025) (0.728)
BE 2.471*** 0.637 1.565*** 0.270
(0.703) (1.406) (0.037) (0.740)
BG 33.188*** 20.127*** 17.427*** −4.366***
(1.747) (2.099) (0.179) (0.543)
CY −19.106*** −21.445*** −2.767*** 5.106***
(1.045) (1.377) (0.060) (0.387)
CZ 3.006*** 0.343 3.226*** −0.563
(0.664) (1.004) (0.035) (0.387)
DE 1.718** −2.929** 1.559*** 3.088***
(0.615) (1.108) (0.028) (0.538)
DK 5.876*** 0.289 7.035*** −1.447
(0.908) (1.977) (0.044) (1.153)
EE 14.648*** 16.468*** 0.997*** −2.818***
(1.395) (1.805) (0.036) (0.432)
EL −37.844*** −40.971*** −10.028*** 13.155***
(0.581) (0.878) (0.072) (0.303)
ES −7.358*** −7.399*** −2.993*** 3.033***
(0.606) (0.881) (0.019) (0.306)
FI 1.753** 0.546 1.098*** 0.110
(0.676) (1.087) (0.020) (0.465)
FR 15.750*** 24.782*** −1.469*** −7.563***
(0.891) (1.527) (0.050) (0.664)
HR −2.115** 0.749 −1.010*** −1.853***
(0.808) (1.289) (0.014) (0.539)
HU −3.413*** −0.867 −2.039*** −0.507
(0.758) (1.303) (0.123) (0.708)
IE −17.145*** −12.355*** −8.512*** 3.723***
(0.802) (1.582) (0.066) (0.796)
IT −15.179*** −22.803*** 1.063*** 6.561***
(0.463) (0.768) (0.054) (0.328)
LT 5.802* 0.997 4.449*** 0.357
(2.338) (3.109) (0.114) (0.909)
LU −1.393 0.006 −1.479*** 0.080
(1.162) (2.034) (0.042) (0.897)
LV −5.795*** −10.080*** 0.396*** 3.889***
(1.382) (1.793) (0.058) (0.526)
MT 23.448*** 26.226*** 0.743*** −3.520***
(1.315) (1.925) (0.047) (0.744)
NL −2.123** −7.176*** 1.328*** 3.725***
(0.750) (1.332) (0.024) (0.627)
PL 18.244*** 13.099*** 10.790*** −5.645***
(0.812) (1.167) (0.054) (0.413)
PT −11.489*** −7.699*** −6.627*** 2.837***
(1.016) (1.633) (0.066) (0.642)
(continued)
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TABLE 1
Continued
Total change Market income/ Discretionary Automatic
population effect policy changes stabilizers
RO 15.603*** 9.993* 11.807*** −6.198***
(4.322) (4.762) (0.688) (1.140)
SE 16.980*** 16.566*** 7.117*** −6.703***
(0.715) (1.230) (0.033) (0.574)
SI −2.774*** −4.560*** −0.071** 1.857***
(0.517) (0.900) (0.025) (0.423)
SK 23.103*** 25.401*** 4.530*** −6.828***
(0.739) (1.089) (0.083) (0.403)
UK −4.658*** −8.859*** 0.215** 3.986***
(1.252) (2.116) (0.067) (0.928)
Notes: Standard errors are calculated based on Taylor approximations. Signiﬁcance levels indicated as *P< 0.1,
**P<0.05, ***P<0.01. Income changes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007–14 for nearly
all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
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Figure 1. Decomposition of the percentage change in mean net income: discretionary policy changes vs
automatic stabilizers.
Notes: Countries are ranked by the total real change in equivalized household net incomes. Income changes
are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007–14 for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
95% of conﬁdence intervals are shown.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
Moving on to automatic stabilizers, in progressive tax-beneﬁt systems, such as the
ones in the EU countries, a shock to gross market incomes should be smoothed by ﬁscal
policies. Conﬁrming this, in all countries automatic stabilizers (Table 1 and dark blue bars
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in Figure 1) worked in the opposite direction to the market income/population effect. Thus,
in countries where average gross market incomes fell, part of the negative shock was offset
by automatic increases in beneﬁt entitlements and reductions in tax liabilities and social
insurance contributions (SIC); conversely, gains in gross market incomes were lowered
through automatic reductions to beneﬁts and increases in taxes/SIC. This can be seen more
clearly in Figure 2, plotting the automatic stabilization effect and discretionary policy
changes against the market income and population effect. More than half of countries are
situated in the left upper section of the left panel in Figure 2, highlighting the importance
of the tax-beneﬁt system in cushioning the adverse income shocks households endured in
the crisis. We estimate a correlation of −0.95 between the effect of automatic stabilizers
and the market income/population effect across countries.
The correlation between discretionary policy changes and changes in gross market
income and population characteristics is 0.6 (right panel of Figure 2). This reﬂects gov-
ernments’ resource constraints in broad terms (as already brieﬂy discussed above). How-
ever, the result only relates to cash beneﬁts and taxes/SIC affecting household disposable
incomes directly. It is conceivable that governments may have counterbalanced these ef-
fects through other means, in particular, through adjusting spending on social protection
in-kind and public services like health and education as well as changes to indirect tax-
ation. To check that, we have plotted our measure of discretionary (cash) policy changes
against these four items (Figure D.1 in Appendix D). We use Eurostat data available on
total government spending on social protection in-kind, health and education and calculate
changes in spending per capita between 2007 and 2014 in 2007 incomes, as a percentage
of per capita disposable income estimated with EUROMOD. The effects of changes to
indirect taxation are limited to changes in standard VAT rates, which we approximate by
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Figure 2. Correlation of automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy changes with the market
income/population effect.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the % change in mean net income due to automatic stabilizers or discre-
tionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % change in mean net income due to the market
income/population effect. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007–14
for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
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assuming that all income is spent on goods and services subject to the standard rate of
VAT. We ﬁnd that the correlation with all four items is positive (stronger in the case of
spending measures), suggesting that across countries changes in these policy measures
complemented rather than offset the effects of discretionary cash policies.
As such, the positive correlation between discretionary policy changes and the market
income/population effect (right panel of Figure 2) shows that when the economy grows,
governments have more ﬁnancial resources at their disposal, through larger tax revenues,
and so, they increase their spending overall. However, this result should not be interpreted
as evidence for pro-cyclical policy changes, in the sense that the net public spending
(beneﬁt spending net of tax revenues) increases (decreases) faster than the economy grows
(contracts). To understand how the structural balance of governments’ ﬁnance varies with
the business cycle, we need to measure the effect of policy changes viz-a-viz growth in the
economy. We do this by estimating the policy effects relative to the growth in mean gross
market incomes (labelled as Market Income Index or MII). For policy actions to be ﬁscally
neutral towards household disposable incomes, the net contribution of beneﬁts and taxes
to household disposable incomes on average should remain constant over time (as a share
of total income). A rising share of beneﬁts would mean that policies have become more
generous, while a declining share would reﬂect ﬁscal tightening. Figure D.2 in Appendix
D plots discretionary policy changes (assessed with MII) against changes in gross market
incomes (assessed with CPI) – our proxy for economic growth excluding the effect of
policy measures – revealing a weak negative correlation. This suggests that changes in
ﬁscal balances due to direct taxes and cash beneﬁts were, if anything, counter-cyclical.
Changes in mean incomes by policy instruments and income decile groups
The impact on incomes due to discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilizers is
further decomposed by beneﬁts and taxes/SIC policies (Figure 3). It clearly shows that auto-
matic responsesweremainly realized through taxes andSICand, on average, beneﬁts played
only a modest part. Furthermore, changes to net income due to taxes/SIC as automatic
stabilizers were negatively associated with changes to market incomes/population charac-
teristics (correlation of −0.96), while there was effectively no correlation between the sta-
bilization response of beneﬁts and market income/population changes (−0.1) (Figure D.3
in Appendix D). On the other hand, the composition of discretionary policy actions was
more balanced and most of the income gains were due to beneﬁts (Figure 3). Unlike with
automatic stabilizers, the correlation between discretionary policy changes and the market
income/population effect was stronger in the case of beneﬁts compared to taxes/SIC (cf.
Figure D.4 in Appendix D). Detailed results on the decomposition of changes to mean
incomes can be found in Table D.1 in Appendix D.
Wealso examinehowsimilar are the impacts of ﬁscal policies and shocks to the economy
on household incomes across the income distribution. We ﬁnd that the patterns of total
change in incomes varied greatly and were neither continuously progressive nor regressive
in majority of cases (Figure D.5 in Appendix D). We repeat the decomposition by income
decile groups in each country. The effect of discretionary policy changes was pro-poor
in most countries, with Hungary and Denmark as the main exceptions (Figure D.6 in
Appendix D). In these two countries, the richest income decile groups beneﬁted relatively
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Figure 3. Decomposition of the percentage change in mean net income by type of policy instrument.
Notes: dpc=discretionary policy changes; as=automatic stabilizers. The total change and market in-
come/population effect are omitted. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period
is 2007–14 for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
more than households in the rest of the distribution through the introduction of a ﬂat income
tax (Hungary) and a reduction in tax rates (Denmark). Overall, changes to taxes and SIC
had amixed effect on the income distribution. On the other hand, policy changes to beneﬁts
tended to be pro-poor and resulted mainly in income gains across the distribution. There
were exceptions where beneﬁt cuts and/or deterioration in the real value of beneﬁts led to
income losses, mostly born by the poorer (in Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal
and the UK). With the exception of Greece, the indexation of public pensions – generally
higher than price inﬂation – was clearly pro-poor across countries, leading to larger relative
income gains at the bottom than at the top of the distribution. In Greece, pension cuts led
to larger income losses at the bottom and middle than the top of the distribution.
Beneﬁts as automatic stabilizers responded to market income and population changes
primarily at the bottom part of the distribution (Figure D.7 in Appendix D). This is not
surprising as many beneﬁts in the EU countries are means-tested and targeted by design
at lower-income households. Insurance-based unemployment beneﬁts are also designed to
respond to losses in earnings and the latter could push individuals towards the bottom of
the distribution. As in many countries households at the bottom saw their market incomes
falling, beneﬁts automatically cushioned part of the income loss making their contribution
to incomechangesmostly progressive.Although the impact on the population-mean income
of beneﬁts was small inmost countries, they contributed to substantial income gains among
poorer households (e.g. of more than 5% for the bottom decile in Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, France, Lithuania, Latvia,Malta, Portugal and
© 2020 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Slovakia). Nevertheless, across all income decile groups we estimate a weak correlation
between changes in gross market incomes and the stabilization response of beneﬁts.12 This
suggests that beneﬁts are more responsive than taxes/SIC to changes in the population
characteristics, which may not be fully visible in changes to market incomes. For instance,
universal beneﬁtswould not provide any stabilization towards income shocks per se but they
could reduce income ﬂuctuations which result from changes to household characteristics.
An example is the entitlement to universal child beneﬁts in the presence of a child in the
household.
In the middle and top of the distribution, income taxes had the biggest stabilization
response, which was regressive in some and progressive in other countries. Where mar-
ket incomes fell throughout most of the income distribution, the automatic stabilization
response was regressive as households from the middle/top beneﬁted more than the bottom
from the reductions in taxes (in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the UK). In other countries, increases in grossmarket incomes at the top of the
distribution were mitigated by increases in taxes, making their contribution progressive (in
Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia, Spain, France,Malta andSweden) (FigureD.7 inAppendixD).
Across all income decile groups, with the exception of the bottom one, market income
and population changes were strongly and negatively correlated with the stabilization
response of income taxes.13 As the income tax schedule – whether progressive or ﬂat –
includes a tax free allowance in all EU countries, households from the bottom decile
group pay no or very little taxes as a share of their income.14 Therefore, income taxes
are less responsive to changes in market incomes at the bottom than middle or top of the
distribution.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that SIC as automatic stabilizers are less strongly correlated with
changes in market incomes in the bottom decile (estimate of −0.43).15 Furthermore, we
estimate a weaker correlation (of −0.69) for the top decile group than for the preceding
eight decile groups, which can be due to a higher share of unearned private income and
the presence of the upper limit on the contribution base in most countries. With the latter,
if earnings are above the maximum threshold, SIC are levied on the maximum instead of
actual earnings, making them non-responsive to changes in earnings in this income range.
In the rest of the income distribution, the automatic response of SIC to market income
changes was similar in relative terms as SIC are usually levied as a ﬂat rate on earnings
(Figure D.7 inAppendix D). The distributional changes are further summarized in the next
section.
12
Our estimates vary between 0 and −0.27 for all income decile groups, apart from the fourth decile group where
the correlation is estimated at −0.48.
13
Our estimate is −0.33 for the ﬁrst decile group, −0.71 for the second and varies between −0.78 and −0.91 for
the rest of the distribution.
14
After the ﬂat tax reform of 2008, only in Bulgaria individuals start paying income taxes from the ﬁrst unit of
income they earn. However, there are several tax deductions (e.g. for families with children) that act as a tax free
allowance for certain household types. Furthermore, our decomposition results show that the stabilization response
averaged over the 2007 and 2014 policies and thus they reﬂect the combined response of the progressive (2007) and
ﬂat (2014) tax schedule.
15
For decile groups 2-9, we estimate a correlation between −0.71 and −0.88.
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Changes in income inequality
After studying changes along the income distribution, we turn to income inequality
measured by the Gini coefﬁcient. Figure 4 ranks the EU-28 countries by the inequality
change between 2007 and 2014 and decomposes it into the same components as previ-
ously. Inequality changes ranged from −2.7% points (Latvia) to +5.1% points (Cyprus),
increasing roughly in about half of the countries and decreasing in the rest, though the over-
all changes in inequality are relatively small and not statistically signiﬁcant in many cases.
However, the way different factors contributed to the total change in the Gini was
remarkably similar across countries. First, changes to the distribution of market incomes
and population characteristics raised income inequality in nearly all countries (and were
statistically signiﬁcant in more than a third), with the change reaching 8.4% points in
Cyprus. Second, our results show that what helped to offset (part of) these increases was the
tax-beneﬁt system. Consistent with the previous literature on discretionary policy changes
(e.g. DeAgostini et al., 2016; Bargain et al., 2017; Paulus et al., 2019), we ﬁnd that, albeit
small in size, they lowered inequality in almost all countries. De Agostini et al. (2016)
show that in most EU countries inequality fell due to discretionary policy changes in the
crisis years (2008-11) as well as in its aftermath (2011-14). In addition, our results show
that countries where inequality fell (Figure 4) were not only those where the welfare state
expanded but also included those which implemented ﬁscal consolidation (Figure 1).
Moving to the effect of automatic stabilizers, we can establish that they had a statistically
signiﬁcant impact in about half of the countries, lowering inequality in most of them
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the change in the Gini coefﬁcient.
Notes: Countries are ranked by the total change in the Gini coefﬁcient. Changes to incomes are estimated in
real terms. The reference period is 2007–14 for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
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Figure 5. Correlation of automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy changes with the market in-
come/population effect.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the % points change in the Gini coefﬁcient due to automatic stabilizers or
discretionary policy changes. The horizontal axis shows the % points change in the Gini due to the market
income/population effect. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference period is 2007–14
for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
(Figure 4). We ﬁnd a negative correlation between automatic stabilizers and the gross
market income/population effect (see the left graph of Figure 5). However, this correlation
is not as strong as with changes in mean incomes. This is expected as automatic stabilizers
are foremost a tool for income stabilization and not designed to directly react to changes
in the distribution of incomes but income changes at the individual level. Hence, the sign
of the relationship between automatic stabilizers and income inequality is ambiguous a
priori. In a few countries, the direction of inequality change due to automatic stabilizers
was the same as for the change due to the market income/population effect (Latvia, UK,
Slovakia, France, Bulgaria and Romania).16
Next, we break down discretionary policy changes and automatic stabilizers by beneﬁts
and taxes/SIC (Figure 6). We ﬁnd that the inequality reduction due to policy changes was
achievedmainlywith beneﬁts. In comparison,Callan,Doorley andSavage (2018) analysing
the Southern EU countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Ireland, ﬁnd small or
no changes to the Gini due to beneﬁt changes, which is also consistent with our results
for these countries. In about a third of the EU countries, the inequality-reducing impact of
beneﬁt changes was enhanced by tax/SIC changes. In a dozen countries, it offset the rise
in inequality due to tax changes, e.g. due to the introduction of a ﬂat tax in Bulgaria or
reduction in top marginal tax rates in Denmark. Moreover, in the countries where beneﬁt
changes raised income inequality this was (at least partly) the result of erosion in the real
value of beneﬁts as their growth lagged behind growth in prices (e.g. in Germany, Hungary,
Ireland and the UK).
16
It is also possible that compared to household net incomes, the effect of automatic stabilizers on inequality is
measured less precisely due to the residual term discussed in Section II. However, the fact that our main conclusions
for changes to mean incomes and inequality are similar, suggests that the residuals have no critical role.
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Figure 6. Decomposition of the change in the Gini coefﬁcient by type of policy instrument.
Notes: dpc=discretionary policy changes; as=automatic stabilizers. The total change and market
income/population effect are omitted. Changes to incomes are estimated in real terms. The reference pe-
riod is 2007–14 for nearly all countries and 2011–14 for Croatia.
Source: Own calculations with EUROMOD and EU-SILC/FRS.
In their role as automatic stabilizers, beneﬁts also reduced inequality in more countries
than taxes/SIC did.Theywere themain stabilising source among the Southern EU countries
and Ireland, consistent with the analysis by Callan et al. (2018) for these countries.At times
when market incomes of the poor fall, means-tested beneﬁts, at least partly, mitigate their
losses. Increases in the unemployment rate, which are linked to an increase in the share of
low-income households, triggers a similar response from insurance-based unemployment
beneﬁts. Such provision of pro-poor income stabilization contributes towards narrowing the
gap between the rich and the poor. However, it also means that when market incomes of the
poor grow, beneﬁt withdrawals would lower these gains, increasing the disparity between
the bottom and the top of the distribution. How the response of beneﬁts to changes in
population characteristics impacts the income distribution is convoluted and depends on
the type of population changes and where they occur along the distribution.
For income taxes, their distributional impact as automatic stabilizers generally depends
on the size and direction of the income shock across the distribution, the progressivity
of the tax schedule and the concentration of people across the tax schedule. Finally, the
distributional impact of SIC as automatic stabilizers is more limited as in most countries a
ﬂat rate is applied on labour earnings.17 Detailed results on the decomposition of changes
to the Gini can be found in Table 2.
17
We estimate a weak and positive correlation of +0.1 between the impact of SIC as automatic stabilizers and
the market income/population effect, on the Gini. In comparison, for the automatic stabilization effect of taxes and
beneﬁts on the Gini, our estimates yield a correlation of −0.48 and −0.53, respectively, with the market income and
population effect.
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5. Conclusions
Tax-beneﬁt policies can affect the income distribution through two main channels: dis-
cretionary policy changes and automatic stabilizers. Although a large body of literature
analyses the impact of tax-beneﬁt policy changes on household incomes, little is known
about the link between automatic stabilizers and the income distribution. We contribute
to the literature by studying in detail the contribution of automatic stabilizers and discre-
tionary policy changes to income changes in the EU countries between 2007 and 2014.
We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, discretionary policy changes raised incomes on average in about two
thirds of countries and lowered them in the remaining third. In comparison, on average
automatic stabilizers – responding to changes to market incomes and population charac-
teristics – led to income gains in about a third, losses in another third of countries and
no statistically signiﬁcant changes in the remaining third. In terms of income inequality,
discretionary policy changes lowered it in more than two-thirds of countries. Progressive
policy changes were implemented not only in countries where the welfare state expanded
in size but also in countries, which implemented ﬁscal consolidation measures in the eco-
nomic downturn. Automatic stabilizers had a statistically signiﬁcant impact on inequality
in about half of countries, lowering inequality in most of them.
Second, discretionary policy changes to beneﬁts – by increasing their level – and the
automatic stabilization response of beneﬁts – mostly to income losses at the bottom of the
distribution –were themain instruments raising the incomes of low-income households and
narrowing the gap between rich and poor. Policy changes to and the automatic stabilization
response of taxes/SIC had a mixed effect on the income distribution of the EU countries.
Whilewe ﬁnd that changes in net income due to the stabilization response of taxes/SICwere
negatively associated with changes to market incomes and population characteristics, the
correlation between the latter and the stabilization response of beneﬁts was much weaker.
This suggests that beneﬁts are more responsive than taxes/SIC to changes in the population
structure such as household composition changes.
Third, in terms of prevalence, discretionary policy changes lowered inequality in more
countries than automatic stabilizers. But in terms of the size of the effects, we cannot
conclude that policy changes contributed to inequality reduction more than automatic
stabilizers, or vice versa. Thus, our ﬁndings show the importance of both discretionary
policy changes and automatic stabilizers to redistribute incomes.
Final Manuscript Received: November 2019.
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